

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01706 01 OF 02 261657Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 OMB-01 AEC-11 IO-14

OIC-04 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAM-01 SAJ-01

H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 DRC-01 EB-11 /176 W

----- 042460

P R 261540Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1761

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1706

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF A MANPOWER

LIMITATION ON WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES IN

A PHASE I AGREEMENT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE RAISES FOR CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE USG THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING IN A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT A PROVISION OF FIXED DURATION LIMITING INCREASED IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. END SUMMARY.

2. AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES ARE AWARE, A NUMBER OF EASTEGJI POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD LEAVE THE NON-US NATO FORCES FREE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01706 01 OF 02 261657Z

TO INCREASE PRIOR TO PHASE II IN ORDER TO COMPENSATE

FOR US WITHDRAWALS. POLISH REPS IN BILATERALS WITH US (VIENNA 1038), NORWEGIAN (VIENNA 1350), AND NETHERLANDS REPS (VIENNA 1613) HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE WESTERN APPROACH OF LIMITING THE FIRST PHASE TO US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE TO BE FOLLOWED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FREEZE THE LEVEL OF OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

3. THESE POLISH SUGGESTIONS HAVE TWO ASPECTS. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY INDICATE SOME WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE EASTERN REPS CONCERNED TO DISCUSS THE ALLIES' TWO-PHASE CONCEPT ON ITS OWN MERITS, AND THEREFORE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS. SECOND, IN OUR VIEW, THEY POINT TO A LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL HAVE TO BE MET IN SOME WAY IF AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED ON FIRST PHASE ALONG THE LINES OF ALLIED PROPOSALS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT, IF THE EAST SHOULD ACCEPT THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE CONCEPT, IT WOULD BE ABANDONING ITS OWN DESIRE TO REDUCE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATO FORCES FROM THE OUTSET, IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE FOR EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO SUGGEST THAT THEY RECEIVE SOME ASSURANCE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES IN THE LIGHT OF EASTERN UNCERTAINTIES THAT THE OUTCOME OF A PHASE II NEGOTIATION WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO THEM. EASTERN REPS WOULD WISH ASSURE THAT, ONCE SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN UNDER A PHASE I REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND A CEILING PLACED ON THE SIZE OF THE REMAINING SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, NON-US NATO FORCES WOULD NOT HAVE COMPLETE FREEDOM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES.

4. POLISH REPS RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE PRACTICAL SENSE, INCREASES IN THE FORCE LEVELS OF NON-US NATO FORCES ARE UNLIKELY IN THE FUTURE, BUT THEY ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH MAKES UP MORE THAN ON-HALF OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, WOULD BE UNDERTAKING A COMMITMENT NOT TO RAISE ITS FORCES IN THE FUTURE AND THAT IT IS ONLY FAIR FOR NATO, HAVING REFUSED TO REDUCE NON-US FORCES UNTIL PHASE II, TO SHOW ITS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 01706 01 OF 02 261657Z

GOOD FAITH BY ACCEPTING A PROBITION AGAINST THE INCREASE OF THOSE FORCES UNTIL PHASE II IS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.

5. ONE POSSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH THESE EASTERN INTERESTS MIGHT BE A MANPOWER LIMITATION AGREEMENT (MLA) ON THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF NON-US AND NON-SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WITH A DEFINITE EXPIRATION

DATE. WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A MEASURE OF THIS KIND FOR INCLUSION IN PHASE I AGREEMENT COULD BE OF VALUE IN INDUCING THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE CONCEPT. IT WOULD OFFER THE EAST ASSURANCES AT A MODEST COST TO THE WEST, SINCE THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ALLIES WOULD WISH TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. A MANPOWER LEVEL PROVISION WITH A FIXED DEADLINE FOR EXPIRATION WOULD BE EVIDENCE OF A WESTERN COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDE PHASE II WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.

6. IT IS TRUE THAT THROUGH SUCH A PROVISION, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED A LIMITED PART OF THEIR OBJECTIVE OF IMPOSING SOME CONTROLS ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE FIRST PHASE. HOWEVER, THE LIMITED DURATION OF THIS PROVISION WOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE RESPONSABLY IN PHASE II, WHILE ACCEPTANCE BY THE EAST OF A SINGLE OVERALL CEILING ON GROUND FORCES MANPOWER WOULD TEND TO PREJUDICE THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS AWAY FROM NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. SUCH A PROPOSAL MIGHT ALSO HELP TO DEFLECT POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF PHASE I OR TO MAKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I A HOSTAGE TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF PHASE 2.

7. THE LIMITATION INVOLVED SHOULD BE ON TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA AND ON TOTAL WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD SET A USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR THE ALLIES PREFERRED FORM OF COMMON CEILING RESULTING FROM PHASE II. REALISTICALLY, THE ALLIES MIGHT FALL BACK TO A CEILING ON "NON-US NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER" AND  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 01706 01 OF 02 261657Z

A CEILING ON "NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER." EVEN IN THIS FORMULATION, THE MANPOWER LIMIT COULD BE USEFUL BECAUSE IT WOULD SERVE TO PREJUDICE PHASE II AGAINST THE NATIONAL CEILINGS WHICH THE SOVIETS SEEKS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 01706 02 OF 02 261733Z

41

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 ACDE-00 DRC-01 EB-11 (ISO) W

----- 043641

P R 261540Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1762

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1706

FROM US REP MBFR

8. A LIMITATION WHICH APPLIED EXPLICITLY AND SOLELY TO MANPOWER WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT UPON ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, IF THE LIMITATION WERE INSTEAD TO BE APPLIED TO "FORCES" IN GENERAL, IT WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS LEVERAGE TO OBJECT TO ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS DURING THE DURATION OF THE PROVISION. SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE PRESUMABLY INTERESTED IN FORCE IMPROVEMENTS FOR THEIR EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES, THEY MIGHT NOT PRESS THE ALLIES TOO HARD ON A WESTERN DESIRE TO RESTRICT THE LIMITATION TO MANPOWER ALONE.

9. HOWEVER, A MANPOWER LIMITATION WHOSE DURATION WOULD BE UNLIMITED WOULD GO TOO FAR TO MEET WHAT APPEARS TO BE A MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN MBFR. WHILE IT WOULD NOT EXACTLY FREEZE THE EXISTING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 01706 02 OF 02 261733Z

RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, IT WOULD FREEZE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES -- STILL UNBALANCED -- THAT WOULD EXIST FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIETS WOULD AS A CONSEQUENCE HAVE LESS INCENTIVE TO AGREE TO ASYMMETRICAL

PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON CEILING. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, IF THEY HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED A MANPOWER LIMIT OF INDEFINITE DURATION WHICH WOULD PERMANENTLY PREVENT INCREASES IN THE BUNDESWEHR, THE SOVIETS WOULD SIMPLY REFUSE TO AGREE TO PHASE II REDUCTIONS EXCEPT ON THEIR OWN TERMS. THE SAME OBJECTIONS APPLY TO A LIMITATION WHICH WOULD TERMINATE ONLY UPON THE COMPLETION OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT. THE DURATION SHOULD THEREFORE BE IN A SPECIFIC TIME RANGE, PERHAPS 3-4 YEARS.

10. A MANPOWER LIMITATION APPROACH APPEARS PREFERABLE TO TRYING TO ACHIEVE THE SAME THING THROUGH A "NON-CIRCUMVENTION" OR A "RESTRAINT DURING NEGOTIATIONS" FORMULA BECAUSE IT IS MORE EASILY POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE AND DURATION OF A SEPARATE PROVISION LIMITING MANPOWER. A PROVISION OF THIS KIND CAN BE OF LIMITED DURATION, WHEREAS A NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA WOULD HAVE TO BE OF THE SAME DURATION AS PHASE I, AND WE WOULD NOT WANT THE DURATION OF PHASE I TO BE LIMITED OR LINKED TO PHASE II. A "RESTRAINT DURING NEGOTIATIONS" AGREEMENT WOULD TERMINATE IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, BUT IT WOULD FREEZE THE ALLIES INTO A POSITION OF INFERIORITY IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STALEMATED AND PROTRACTED. FURTHERMORE, ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE HELD BY THE SOVIETS TO VIOLATE A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON LIMITING "FORCES," WHILE A LIMITATION EXPLICITLY ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD AVOID THIS RISK. THESE ADVANTAGES APPEAR TO OUTWEIGHT THE FACT THAT A SPECIFIC PROVISION MIGHT BE HARDER TO NEGOTIATE THAN SOME MORE GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA BECAUSE OF THE EXPLICITNESS OF A PROVISION, WHOSE ADVANTAGES WOULD BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON ITS BEING LIMITED TO MANPOWER AND A FIXED DURATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 01706 02 OF 02 261733Z

1. THE DELEGATION REQUESTS THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING A PROVISION LIMITING MANPOWER OF NON-US NATO AND NON-SOVIET PACT FORCES IN A FIXED PERIOD OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT WITH A VIEW TO ASCERTAINING WITHIN THE USG WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A PROVISION IS ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE. (AGREEMENT ON POSSIBLE TEXT WOULD BE A LATER STEP.) IT IS IN OUR VIEW PREMATURE TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT IN BRUSSELS. PERHAPS THE BEST APPROACH IS TO REFRAIN FROM FLOATING THE IDEA IN THE AD HOC GROUP UNTIL THERE ARE MORE INDICATIONS OF

EASTERN INTEREST IN ACCEPTING THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE APPROACH AND POLISH INTEREST IN A FREEZE IS PICKED UP BY OTHER EASTERN DELEGATIONS, SO THAT THE ISSUE BECOMES MORE TOPICAL.

12. IF THIS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION SHOULD OCCUR, WE WOULD PLAN TO REQUEST WASHINGTON TO CONSIDER WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES ACTUALLY PERTAINING, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO PROPOSE TO THE AD HOC GROUP, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE NAC, THAT DESIGNATED ALLIED REPS TELL THE EAST THAT (A) THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INFORMAL EASTERN SUGGESTIONS OF A FREEZE ON MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES SUGGESTED BY THE ALLIES; (B) THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO EXAMINE THIS POSSIBILITY IF THE EAST WOULD IN RETURN INDICATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO POSTPONE REDUCTIONS OF NON-US FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION.

13. THE FOREGOING MAKES CLEAR THAT THE DELEGATION IS NOT MAKING A RECOMMENDATION, BUT REQUESTING THAT NECESSARY PREPARATION BE MADE IN THE EVENT OF A SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY. A STATEMENT OF THE KIND PROPOSED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH WOULD NOT REPRESENT EVEN A VAGUE WESTERN COMMITMENT UNLESS THE EAST SHOULD ACTUALLY AGREE TO A TWO-PHASE PROGRAM ON THE ALLIED MODEL, BUT EQUALLY, IT COULD NOT BE MADE WITHOUT PRIOR STUDY OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE. WE REQUEST THAT THE SUGGESTED USG STUDY BE INITIATED NOW AND THAT IT BE COMPLETED IF FEASIBLE PRIOR TO MARCH 18. IF  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 01706 02 OF 02 261733Z

THE OUTCOME IS FAVORABLE, THIS WOULD LEAVE TIME ENOUGH TO USE THE FORMULA SUGGESTED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH WITH THE EAST PRIOR TO THE EASTER BREAK SHOULD THE ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS JUSTIFY IT. HUMES

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GROUND FORCES, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 FEB 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974VIENNA01706  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t1974027/aaaaagpf.tel  
**Line Count:** 318  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <22 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF A MANPOWER LIMITATION ON WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES IN  
**TAGS:** PARM, XG, XT, US, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005